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Clare F. Beckton* The Impact on Women of
Entrenchment of Property
Rights in the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms**
I. Introduction
On Friday, 29 April 1983 the Progressive Conservative opposition in
Parliament proposed an amendment to the constitution which would
change section 7 of the existing Charter to read:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty, security of the person and
enjoyment of property and the right not to be deprived thereof
except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
(emphasis added to identify amendment)
The language used to present this amendment shows that its propo-
nents were espousing a very traditional view of property. For exam-
ple, Jake Epp said:
The principle that property belongs to men or women is steeped in
British Common Law .... In the British context, private property
has always historically been associated with the development of
free institutions. It goes back to 1215 when the Magna Carta
referred to it. It is referred to in the Bill of Rights of 1627. We can
refer to the United States Constitution, if we want to draw on the
experience to private ownership of land. All these documents have
reference to private ownership of land. They recognized that not
only should those rights be recognized in fact, they should also be
a constitution reality.'
The view expressed in this excerpt is not compatable with the modem
welfare state. It stems from an era when land was most significant to
the economic base of a nation and a person's liberty and status was
dependant upon possession of real property. Canada is a welfare state
where many depend for their livelihood upon government benefits
and jobs, rather than on land ownership. To entrench an outdated
view of property would not be beneficial to women nor to many men
in our society. However, the statements of those initially proposing
an amendment do not control it. The meaning or objects of the
*Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
*This paper was originally prepared for the Canadian Advisory Council on the
Status of Women. I am grateful for their permission to publish this work.
1. 126 House of Commons Debates, Friday, 29 April 1983; 24997.
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proposed amendment could be clarified prior to entrenchment if it is
considered to be a beneficial addition to the Charter.
In this article I propose to assess whether the entrenchment of
property rights would be detrimental or beneficial to women in Can-
ada. I will examine the philosophical theories of property, the Ameri-
can experience with guaranteed property rights and the implications
of Canadian requirements for fairness and natural justice. In particu-
lar, how those guarantees and requirements have affected matrimon-
ial property schemes and the division of pension rights in the United
States will be examined, and how they will likely affect equivalent
developments in Canada.
II. Philosophy
Property to the average person is a thing, but for legal purposes it is a
right in the sense of an enforceable claim to the use or benefit from a
thing.2 It extends beyond rights in private real property to encompass
rights in intangible property. Property can also be described as a
system of rights of each person in relation to other persons, this
system being enforced or determined by the state.3
One of the earlier pervasive theories of property originated with
John Locke. He argued that every individual had a natural right to
an unlimited amount of property.4 Locke perceived the role of the
government as guardian of this right to unlimited property with the
power to take private property only when it was essential to protect
property as an institution. In his theory Locke assumed that there
was adequate property to satisfy all those who could through the
fruits of their labour make use of it. At the time when he articulated
this theory men were the primary landowners. In addition there were
new lands waiting for those who wished to acquire real property. A
number of constitutions, which guaranteed property rights such as
that of the United States, were premised upon Locke's theory.
Since the writings of Locke, new theories have developed concern-
ing property rights. All subsequent theorists advocate property rights
2. C.B. MacPherson, Property, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, (1978), p. 3.
This has also been the position adopted by the American courts. For example see
Board of Regents v. Roth (1971), 408 U.S. 564 at 572 where the court stated '"The
court also made clear that property interests protected by procedural due process
extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels or money."
3. MacPherson, id., at 4.
4. Peter Laslett, The Treatises of Government: A Critical Edition with an Introduc-
tion and Apparatus Criticism, Cambridge University Press, (1964).
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- it is the amount and kind of right that has changed. The different
theories reflect the changing nature of our society, in particular the
expectation surrounding the role of government.
The philosopher who departed most fundamentally from Locke's
view was Jean Jacques Rousseau.5 He disagreed with Locke that
every person had a right to unlimited property although he did agree
that a right to property was founded in natural law. Rousseau's
theory advocated a right to a limited amount of property, that being
the amount that a person could work on. If an unlimited amount was
guaranteed many would become propertyless and dependent upon
those who controlled the property. It was still apparent in Rousseau's
theory, however, that his emphasis was on private real property.6
In wasn't until the development of the industrial society that the
concept of property began to change. Karl Marx probably had the
greatest influence in exposing the evils of the industrialized society
which tended to treat the worker as a commodity. He argued that the
development of a capitalistic society removed the existing basis of
property. In his Communist Manifesto, Marx argued that the existing
society concentrated wealth and property in the hands of a few at the
expense of the remaining society.7 He advocated the abolition of
private property and the formation of community property which
would benefit everyone.
While Marx's theories were not generally accepted in democratic
states, he was instrumental in disclosing some of the myths that
permeated the current theories of property rights. Following Marx,
John Stuart Mill and Thomas Green re-asserted the need for a gua-
ranteed right of property. Mill's theory was based on a modified form
of utilitarianism 8 and Green's on the premise that property is an
extension of human personality and is required to fully develop a
person's moral personality. Green's theory therefore advocated an
5. Roger D. Masters (ed.), The First and Second Discourses of Rousseau New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1964.
6. See also Jeramy Bentham, The Theory of Legislation, C.K. Ogden (ed.), Lon-
don, Kegan Paul 193. Bentham's theory of property was part of his overall theory of
utilitarianism which required finding an allocation which brought the greatest happ-
iness to the greatest number. However, his focus was primarily on private property
- in particular land.
7. Communist Manifesto (1948).
8. Principles of Political Economy with some of Their Applications to Social Philo-
sophy in: The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume II, J.M. Robson (ed.),
London Routledge and Kegan Paul, (1965).
9. Works, London, Longmans Green, 1885-8.
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unlimited right to property. 9
During the 20th century the philosophers began to develop theor-
ies of property rights that were more reflective of the modern society.
Two of the most heralded are Moris Cohen and Charles Reich.
Cohen, while not opposed to property rights, recognized that proper-
ty is a weapon of power. 10 In spite of this, he still maintained that
there should be a guaranteed right of property subject to the state's
power to impose restrictions on its use or transfer or to confiscate it
where the welfare of society demanded it. His theory expresses a new
awareness that property is not unlimited and individuals must live in
close contact, with its consequent risk that the actions of one may be
harmful to the rights of another.
Reich, however, has the most developed theory of the nature of
property in the modem society."I While others such as Cohen were
evolving theories concerning basically the changing nature of real
property,'" Reich struck at the fundamental nature of the welfare
state and its property concepts. His thesis begins with the premise
that the growth of government largesse and power has created a
society in which the individual is dependent upon the state for much
of his or her well-being; as a result of his dependence upon the
government largesse, the individual feels the government power.
Reich considers this growing dependence endangers individual self-
development and growth. He asserts this new form of property,
which is linked to status, should be held as of right. Thus benefits,
such as unemployment and public assistance, should be guaranteed
rights. Deprivation of them would be justifiable not for reasons of
fault of the individual claimant, but only for overriding demands of
public policy. Thus everyone would be permitted to remain self-suffi-
cient and to develop as an individual. In essence forms of government
largesse have, for many, replaced the kind of property initially con-
templated by the United States Constitution and it is essential that
this new property be secure from unwarranted government
intervention.
10. Cohen M., Law and the Social Order, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Com-
pany, 1933.
11. 'The New Property" (1964), 73 Yale Law Journal, 733.
12. See also, Veblen, Thorstein, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in
Recent Times: The Case of America, copyright 1923 by B.W. Huebsch; Tawney,
R.H., The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society, Fabian Society and George Allen &
Unwin, 1920.
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While Reich's theory has not been totally accepted by the courts in
the United States it has been accepted in part with the recent devel-
opments pursuant to the due process guarantees.
In summation, it can be said the newer philosophers have departed
from Locke's concept of guaranteed right to unlimited property, in
favour of a new theory which recognizes government largesse as
property. If there are to be any benefits to women from entrench-
ment of property rights, they cannot arise from the outdated property
concepts that are made the foundation for the proposed amendment
to section 7 of the Canadian Charter.
In analysing the potential impact of an entrenched property right,
it is useful to look at the United State's constitutional guarantee of
the right to property. It is helpful to point out that while Locke's
theories formed the basis for those property guarantees, the courts
have interpreted them in a manner that has been consistent with
society as it has changed. In fact, in recent times the degree of
protection has been minimal as it relates to the substantive right.
III. The United States Approach
Property rights were perceived as essential by the drafters of the
American constitution since it was to achieve economic as well as
political ends. In fact it was apparent that many believed the entire
constitution revolved around the protection of property rights. This
sentiment was partially echoed by the United States Supreme Court
in Ochoa v. Hernandez'3 when it declared
Without the guarantee of due process the right of private property
cannot be said to exist in the sense in which it is known to our
laws. The principle.., has been recognized since the Revolution
as among the safest foundation of our institutions.
The primary property guarantees are contained in the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth guarantees that with reference
to the Federal government,
No person ... nor be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law nor shall private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.
13. (1913) 230 U.S. 139, 161.
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The Fourteenth guarantees that
... nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty without due process of law; nor to deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
While it was intended that the fourteenth amendment would be
the only one applicable to the states, the courts have made most of
the amendments guaranteeing essential rights applicable to them.
While both the fifth and fourteenth amendments guarantee the
right not to be deprived of property except by due process of law, for
many year the Supreme Court assumed that it had an inherent right
to review the substance of legislation which either the Congress or the
states had enacted. This view stemmed in part from the then prevail-
ing natural law theory that certain rights existed for all persons and
that the government could not override these rights. The principle of
substantive due process was explicitly articulated in Mugler v. Kan-
sas14 where the court upheld a statute that prohibited the sale of
alcoholic beverages. While the statute was valid, the court made it
clear that there were limits upon legislative action and it was the
courts that would determine if the state had exceeded its authority.
For an enactment interfering with property rights or the right to
contract to be valid it had to have a substantial relation to the
protection of the public health, morals or safety of the state. This test
was a recognition of the fact that the government must have the
power to protect its citizens. It became known as the state's police
power. Justice Taney articulated it well:
While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded we must
not forget, that the community also have rights, and that the
happiness and well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful
preservation. I I
By the beginning of the twentieth century the Supreme court had
indicated its willingness to strike down any economic or social legisla-
tion which interfered with freedom to contract.' 6 The consequence
was that only legislation which the members of the court felt served
14. (1887) 123 U.D. 623.
15. Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837), 11 Pet. 420, 548; also for a
modem statement see Berman v. Parker (1954), 348 U.S. 26, 32 where the court
said "It springs from the obligation of the state to protect its citizens and provide for
the safety and good order of society. It is the governmental power of
self-protection."
16. Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897), 165 U.S. 578.
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legitimate public interests could withstand their scrutiny. The evolu-
tion of substantive due process reached its height in the now infam-
ous decision in Lochner v. New York 7 where the court invalidated a
New York law which would have limited the hours that a baker
could work to sixty per week. The majority held the statute was
unconstitutional because it was an arbitrary and unnecessary infrin-
gement on freedom of contract and the liberty of the person. While
the court was willing to allow the regulation for health reasons, they
were quick to point out that the bakers were not in need of such
protection since their job posed no more danger to health than many
other jobs. It was apparent from the majority decision that they
simply disagreed with the economic theories that were developing at
that time. Justice Holmes, in his famous dissent, castigated the
majority for their view.
But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular econom-
ic relation of the citizen to the state or of laissezfaire. It is made
for people of fundamentally differing views and the accident of
our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and
even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the ques-
tion of whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Consti-
tution of the United States. 8
In assessing the likelihood of an interpretation such as Lochner in
Canada under an amended section 7 it must be kept in mind that
even in the early twentieth century the laissezfaire concept was the
predominate philosophy. The transition to substantially increased
government regulation of the economy was just beginning. Further-
more, as more governmental intervention became essential the court
retreated from their position of reviewing the substance of economic
and social regulation. The transformation began following the
Supreme Court's invalidation of much of Roosevelt's New Deal legis-
lation on the assumption that this represented the greatest threat so
far to the free enterprise system.19 Following an attempt by Roosevelt
to pack the court, it began to abandon its substantive due process
review of economic and welfare legislation.
While the court retreated from the exercise of substantive due
17. (1905), 198 U.S. 45.
18. Id., at 75-76.
19. For a greater discussion see Wright, B.F., The Growth of American Constitu-
tional Law; McCloskey, The American Supreme Court., Chicago, Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1960.
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process with respect to social and economic measures, it clearly indi-
cated that it would continue to exercise such a review to protect other
constitutional guarantees and liberties. In Stanton v. Stanton20 the
Supreme court invalidated a Utah statute which specified that for
child support purposes the age of majority for women was eighteen
but twenty-one for men. The basis of the decision was that for a
classification to be constitutional:
• . . [I]t must be reasonable not arbitrary and must rest upon some
grounds of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike.2 .
-In this case the court said the assumption that women matured earlier
and married earlier was not a sufficient nor a satisfactory ground for
differentiating between boys and girls. In Califano v. Westcott 22 the
Court took a similar position. That issue was section 407 of the
California Social Securities Act which provided benefits to families
whose dependent children had been deprived of parental support
because of the unemployment of the father but provided no benefits
if the unemployed person was the mother. Mrs. Westcott had been
the primary breadwinner prior to her unemployment and would have
qualified for relief had she been the father. The court invalidated the
legislation on the basis that the gender classification was not substan-
tially related to the attainment of any important and valid statutory
goal but was rather part of the baggage of sexual stereotyping that
presumed the father had the primary responsibility to provide for the
family.
There are a number of other decisions where the court has rein-
forced their position that when the state gives to or deprives an
individual of benefits, they must not only comply with the principles
of procedural due process but must not infringe upon any of the other
20. (1974), 421 U.S. 7.
21. Id., at 14.
22. (1979), 99 S.CU. 2655.
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rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. 23 While these decisions are
premised upon the guarantees in the equal protection clause, they are
significant for the interpretation of rights because they make it clear
that, while the states have the ability to define what constitutes
property, they must do so in accordance with other fundamental
values protected by the constitution.
IV. Procedural Due Process
When the United States Supreme Court retreated from its general
substantive due process doctrine, a multiplicity of cases arose under
procedural due process. Of concern to us are the cases on due process
as it relates to the property guarantees in the fourteenth amendment.
It is the fourteenth amendment which applies to the states and it is
the states who are most involved with private property and welfare.
However, the principles can also be applied under the fifth amend-
ment when the federal government is involved.
Two basic issues arise. The first is what constitutes property and
the second is when is the state depriving someone of property? The
latter question involves the state action doctrine, which will be of
concern under section 32 of the Canadian Charter since it arguably
only applies to governmental action. In the American context it is
quite clear that governmental enforcement of private claims to prop-
erty by one person against another is a deprivation of property which
invokes the application of the due process clause.24 Matrimonial
property legislation could be viewed in this context as a resolution of
claims between individuals, although it may be more accurate to
regard it as a process for ensuring that family members and society
are protected upon dissolution of a union.
23. Also see Orr v. Orr (1979), 99 S. Ct. 1102 where an Alabama statute which
only permitted alimony payments to be imposed upon husbands was struck down on
the basis that there was no rational basis for this classification. In Frontiero v.
Richardson (1973), 411 U.S. 677 a statute which provided the wife of a male
serviceman with dependent's benefits but not the husband of a servicewoman unless
she proved that she supplied more than one half of her husband's support was
rendered void on the basis that the classification was based on the over broad
generalization that female spouses would normally be dependent but not vice-versa.
Weinbierger v. Wiesinfed (1974), 420 U.S. 636 involved a social security Act where
contributions were made by a wage earner. Benefits were granted on the earnings of
a deceased husband and father to his widow and minor children but granted only to
a deceased wife's minor children. The court held that this was unconstitutional
because it was based upon the invalid generalization that a wife's income was not
vital to her family's support.
24. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969), 395 U.S. 337.
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What tends to be the more important question is what constitutes
property. If Reich's theory were to be accepted, most essential forms
of government largesse would be guaranteed property rights. The
American courts, however, have never fully adopted Reich's theory.
In their earlier interpretations the courts classified the recipients of
welfare payments or public education as having no property interest
since the government had no obligation to provide these benefits. In
fact, a system of rights and privileges existed by which benefits like
licenses were regarded as privileges and, as such, not subject to the
limitations imposed by the due process clause.2 5
However, in 1971 the Supreme Court clearly repudiated the doc-
trine that procedural due process application was to be determined by
the right-privilege dichotomy. In Graham v. Richardson, Mr. Justice
Blackman wrote for the court: 'This court now has rejected the
concept that constitutional rights turn upon whether a governmental
benefit is characterized as a 'right' of 'or as a privilege." 26 One of the
reasons for the court's recognition that the state should not have an
unfettered discretion to withhold even "privileges" appears to have
been the extensive amount of literature criticizing this dichotomy in
the context of the new concept of property.
The first serious efforts to deal with issues about the new property
came in the Supreme Court decision of Goldberg v. Kelly. 2 7 The issue
in Goldberg was whether a state, which terminated public assistance
payments without giving the recipient an evidentiary hearing, denied
the recipient due process. Although the parties conceded the due
process clause was applicable, Justice Brennan examined the issue of
whether welfare benefits fell within the definition of property. As the
criteria for determination, he considered the importance of the benef-
it to the individual and the likely grievousness of its loss.2"
This test was rejected shortly after by the Supreme Court in two
significant decisions, Board of Regents v. Roth29 and Perry v. Sind-
25. See Van Alstyne, "The Demise of the Right-Privilege Doctrine in Constitution-
al Law" (1968), 81 Harvard Law Rev. 1439.
26. (1971), 403 U.S. 365, 374.
27. (1969), 397 U.S. 254.
28. Id., at 263. The full statement was: "The extent to which procedural due process
must be afforded the recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may be
'condemned to suffer grievous loss' ... and depends upon whether the recipient's
interest, in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary
adjudication."
29. (1972), 408 U.S. 564.
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erman. 3 0 Roth, who was hired for a fixed term of one academic year
to teach at a state university, was informed without explanation that
he would not be rehired for the following year. In assessing whether
he was entitled to due process, the court said that one must look to
the nature of the interest at stake and not to its weight. 3' The court
stated, "to have a property interest in a benefit... he must.. have a
legitimate claim of entitlement to it."'3 2 It was the court's opinion
that the concepts and scope of property rights are defined by existing
rules or understandings "that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits." 33
In Sindernan the respondent was employed for ten years as a
professor under a series of one year contracts. The Regents terminat-
ed his appointment for the following year without an explanation or
a prior hearing. The court in ascertaining whether he had an entitle-
ment stated:
A person's interest in a benefit is a property interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understanding
that support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he
may invoke at a hearing.
34
Sinderman's expectation of tenure was enough of an entitlement to
make him subject to due process protections.
Sinderman and Roth were a retrenchment from the position initial-
ly adopted by the court in Goldberg to the effect that the importance
of the benefit to the individual determined whether there were due
process rights. The impact of these decisions was the creation of a
doctrine which permits the states to determine what property rights
they will establish but leaves it to the courts to determine if the
procedures are adequate to protect an expectation that has risen to
the level of a property interest. The approach in both cases has been
subject to extensive debate and criticism.35 Some critics do so on the
30. (1972), 408 U.S. 593.
31. Supra, note 27, at 571.
32. Id., at 577.
33. Id.
34. Supra, note 28, at 601.
35. For examples of some of ;this discussion see H.P. Monaghan, "Of 'Liberty' and
'Property' (1977), 62 Cornell Law Rev. 405; W. Van Alstyne, "Cracks in 'the New
Property Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative State"' (1977), 62 Cornell
Law Rev. 445, Peter N. Simon, "Liberty and Property in the Supreme Court, A
Defence of Roth and Perry" (1983), 71(1) California Law Rev. 146; Stephen F.
Williams, "Liberty and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits" (1983),
XII Journal of Legal Studies 3; Abraham Chayes, "Foreward, Public Law Litigation
and the Burger Court" (1982), 96 Harvard Law Rev. 4.
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basis that the courts should not rely on the state to create the interest,
but should, instead, re-instate the doctrine of substantive due process.
Others focus their criticism on the test that the courts use to ascertain
if an individual is entitled to protection. Basically, it states that
entitlement only arises when a benefit has been granted in such a
manner that it creates an expectation that an individual will continue
to receive it, unless it is removed according to fair procedure.
The courts since Roth have continued to invalidate legislation or to
render unconstitutional activities of state officials where they have
found a "property" interest. The cases demonstrate the diversity of
interests that will be classified as property by the courts. In 1970, for
example, the Supreme Court invalidated a Georgia motor vehicle
provision which required that the registration and licence of an unin-
sured motorist, who was involved in an accident, be suspended unless
the owner posted security to cover the amount of damages claimed
by aggrieved parties in respect of the accident, irrespective of fault.3 6
The court said that the state action infringed upon important interests
of a licensee because, once a license is issued, continued possession
may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court held that disability
payments were a statutorily created "property" interest which was
protected by the due process clause.37 Finally in Logan v. Zimmer-
man Brush Co., the Supreme Court held that an employee's right to
the use of the Fair Employment Practices Act's adjudicatory proce-
dures was a species of property protected by the due process clause.38
The court held that, while the state had the power to create substan-
tive defences or immunities in the adjudication or to eliminate the
statutorily created cause of action altogether, it could not arbitrarily
destroy an employee's property at will. In this recent decision the
court re-affirmed the principle that once a right of action or a legiti-
mate expectation of entitlement is created, then it cannot be removed
except in accordance with due process protections. These decisions
tend to focus on the "new property" since there is no doubt that
traditional forms of property qualify for due process protection.
36. Belly. Burson (1970), 402 U.S. 535.
37. (1975), 424 U.S. 319.
38. (1982), 102 S. Ct. 1148.
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In summation, the American position appears to be that even
though the government is not required to give benefits, such as
welfare and public housing, if it distributes them, it must do so in
accordance with constitutional principles such as equal protection.
Once a system has been established which creates a claim of entitle-
ment for an individual, the due process clause will apply. A claim of
entitlement arises if the law establishes criteria for continued receipt
of benefits and the individual appears to meet these criteria. If in fact
the law creates no claim to future payments, then an individual has
no claim. Furthermore, until an individual is in receipt of benefits,
the courts do not seem to require fair procedures, however, this point
has not been put truly to the test since the Supreme Court has never
been asked to determine if denial of access to a right, such as public
education, requires fair procedures.
V. Fairness and Natural Justice in Canada
At present the Canadian law does not differ substantially from Amer-
ican except in the history of its evolution and the titles used. In
Canada natural justice and fairness have evolved in the absence of
constitutional due process guarantees. The principles underlying the
Canadian system of judicial review of administrative action seem to
be that an individual is entitled to be treated with respect and to be
fairly treated by the state. The process of determination of rights is
similar to that used by American courts. In deciding whether the
principles of natural justice have been complied with, the courts have
started with issues of entitlement and followed them with assessment
of the adequacy of the procedure itself.39 The British and Canadian
courts have tended to focus on the nature of the function being
exercised pursuant to statutory power; if it was a judicial or quasi-ju-
dicial function, the claimant was entitled to a fair hearing.40 The
courts assumed in those situations that an individual's rights would
be affected and therefore he or she had a right to be heard. Cooper v.
Board of Works for the Wandsworth District is an expression of the
oft-cited principle that there is a right to property which can only be
removed by clear statutory language or following a fair hearing.4'
39. For a more detailed discussion see Evans, Janisch, Mullan & Risk, Administra-
tive Law, Cases, Text and Materials, Toronto, Emond-Montgomery 1980.
40. For example, see Cooper v. The Board of Works for the Wandsworth District
(1863), 14 C.B. (N.S.) 180, 143 E.R. 414 (Eng. C.P.).
41. Id.; also see Knapman v. Board of Health for Saltfleet Township, [1954] 3
D.L.R. 760 (Ont. H.C.).
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There appears to be no doubt that the courts sanction infringements
on property rights provided they are effected through the principles
of natural justice.
When the courts were faced with a decision-maker exercising a
purely administrative function they took the view that there was no
entitlement to a fair hearing.42 However, in recent years the courts
have developed the doctrine of fairness which seems to require some
form of procedural entitlement even when the function exercised is
purely administrative. The new approach seems to recognise that the
classification of an official's function is difficult and to endow some
claimants with procedural protection but others with none is to work
an injustice. Furthermore, it may reflect an awareness by the courts
of the often serious impact on an individual of the exercise of even a
purely administrative function. Chief Justice Laskin made this clear
in Re Nicholson and Haldiman and Norfolk Regional Board of Com-
missioners of Police when he stated that even though the statute did
not provide procedural protection for a probationary constable, fair-
ness required that he be told why his services were no longer required
and be given an opportunity to reply. 3 While not bestowing upon
him the rigours of the procedural entitlements of natural justice, the
court made it clear that the board could not act in an arbitrary
manner. Therefore, in the end result Nicholson was entitled to more
procedural fairness than Roth, who had the existence of due process
guarantees to rely upon.
The fairness doctrine is new and still developing in Canada. Many
issues remain unresolved with respect to the extent to which the
fairness doctrine applies and its procedural content.44 It is clear that
fairness will apply to a question of terminating benefits once
received,4 5 but not necessarily to the initial question of entitlement to
benefits, such as welfare, if the statute granting it does not specify the
42. Calgary Power Ltd. v. Copithorne, [1959] S.C.R. 24, 16 D.L.R. (2d) 24. This
case dealt with a ministerial expropriation. The court made it clear that since the
minister was not exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function his decision was
administrative and was to be made in accordance with the statutory requirements to
be guided by his own views.
43. [1979] S.C.R. 111, 88 D.L.R. )3d) 671.
44. See for example, Loughlin, "Procedural Fairness: A Study of the Crisis in
Administrative Law Theory" [ 1978] 28 University of Toronto Law Journal 215; and
Mullan, "Fairness the New Natural Justice" (1975), 24 University of Toronto Law
Journal, 281.
45. Re Webb and Ontario Housing Corporation (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 (Ont.
C.A.).
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procedure to be followed. It does seem, however, from the flood of
recent decisions that the courts have been moving closer to a
requirement that most administrative functions must be exercised
fairly, although short of a full trial-type hearing. In determining the
applicable procedure, the courts try to assess the nature of the power,
the consequences of its exercise, and the relationship between the
individual and the authority
6.4
Thus, since their retrenchment from substantive due process, the
American courts by relying upon a guaranteed right to property, and
the Canadian courts, even in the absence of constitutional guaran-
tees, have created similar rules for the protection of individuals from
arbitrary administrative action. Many of the natural justice and fair-
ness cases in Canada involved government largesse. Part of the sim-
ilarity of development stems from the changing nature of North
American society as a result of the growing dependence of the invid-
ual upon government distribution of monetary resources. The courts
of both countries have attached procedural protection to this new
property, although they have never compelled the government to
create such programmes.
These developments are particularly important in any assessment
of the impact on women of constitutionally entrenching rights to
property. Mary Ann Glendon makes this point when she says:
The new family law reflects a world where traditional forms of
property are often less important than what have come to be
known as entitlements and it manifests a new concern with the
family property of groups of the population whose principle
wealth is apt to be composed of such assets as wages, pension
rights, households goods and a lease, or perhaps some equity in a
mortgaged home. In public family law, the lack of property rather
than its possession claims attention
7.4
If Mary Ann Glendon is right, then real property becomes less
important. Certainly, if the assumption that women are largely a
propertyless class refers to their lack of real property, then it becomes
apparent that women may need more protection with respect to the
new forms of property such as jobs, government benefits and pension
rights. Certainly it is essential to ensure that access to these benefits
are not unfairly denied to women.
46. Ibid.
47. Glendon, Mary Ann, The New Family and the New Property, Toronto, Butter-
worths, 1981 at 117.
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VI. Section 7 of the Charter
How then would an entrenched property right affect women? The
suggested amendment to Section 7 of the Charter would guarantee
both the right to enjoyment of property and the right not to be
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice.
An initial problem is attempting to ascertain how the courts will
define property. If it is interpreted to mean the traditional form of
property, then it will not be a meaningful guarantee to many who do
not own anything beyond their personal possessions. If it is interpret-
ed in the new property sense, it has the potential to benefit women
who do not own real property. However, that potential benefit must
be balanced against its potential to harm women's attempts to
acquire real property.
There are also other problems of interpretation with an amended
section 7. One is whether the section embodies procedural guarantees
only or whether it also imparts substantive protection. Commen
tators differ while the Ontario Court of Appeal has taken the view
that section 7 is procedural only. 48 If in fact the courts accept a
substantive interpretation, then the rights could still be limited in
accordance with section 1. Under such an interpretation, it may be
possible for the courts to assess the wisdom of legislation which
purports to limit those rights.
The impact of a procedural approach, arguably, is to constitution-
alize aspects of the current administrative law which deal with natu-
ral justice and fairness. Prior to the Charter, the courts could only
assess the actions of the administrators or interpret statutes to ascer-
tain what procedures were required for compliance with the princi-
ples of natural justice and fairness. A court could fill in procedures
when they were lacking but, if procedures were specifically denied by
a statute, it could not require them. Under the Charter, however, on
a procedural interpretation, the courts could assess the statutes to
ascertain if procedurally they are in compliance with section 7 gua-
48. R. v. Potma (January 14, 1983) Ont. C.A. A number of lower court decisions
have tried to grapple with this issue for example seeR. v. Cadeddu (1983), 2 C.R.D.
900.150-01; R. v. Nunery (1983) 2 C.R.D. 150-02; Oblin v. Vancouver Police
Department (1983), 2 C.R.D. 800-81. Also see Patrice Garant, "Fundamental
Freedoms and Natural Justice" in: Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin (ed.), Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Commentary, Toronto, Carswell Co., 1982; Man-
ning & Morris, Rights, Freedoms and the Courts. Carswell, Toronto, Emond-Mont-
gomery, 1983.
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rantees, and could invalidate them if they are in breach, in the same
manner as the American courts. Since there is a past history of
judicial development to rely on, the courts are likely to move in this
direction.
A further problem concerns the effect of the placement of section 7
under the rubric of legal rights. This location seems to suggest that
any procedural guarantee would require a court-type hearing. Cer-
tainly such an interpretation would not be beneficial to those whose
rights are infringed by bodies not exercising court-like functions and
where a trial-type hearing would be inappropriate. In fact the courts
could exclude from the guarantees the exercise of purely administra-
tive functions.
It seems highly likely that the courts will read section 7 in the
context of the other guarantees in the charter. Thus a deprivation
would not be in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice
if it were to be made on a discriminatory basis or for reasons that
would infringe on freedom of expression or religion and the like. For
example, an individual should not lose his/her liberty for freely
expressing views about the current government.
The term "security of the person" warrants further examination.
The Law Reform Commission of Canada defined it as meaning "not
only protection of one's physical integrity but the provision of neces-
saries for its support." 49 Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services,
and the right to security in the event of unemployment sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
While it may be desirable, it is unlikely, even given a substantive
interpretation, that the courts would read into section 7 a positive
right to government benefits; such a stance would impose a positive
obligation on the governments which would have the effect of
determining government policy, rather than assessing its effects on
guaranteed rights. However, if section 7 is to be given a procedural
interpretation, the courts may well interpret this provision to include
government benefits which are essential to the security of the person,
49. Medical Treatment and the Criminal Law, Working Paper No. 26, L.R.C.C.
Ottawa.
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such as welfare, unemployment and old age payments. The procedu-
ral approach would only involve courts in assessing whether approp-
riate procedural safeguards had been observed in the course of deny-
ing or depriving an individual of entitlements. On the other hand, the
court may well interpret section 7 simply to mean physical security of
the person, for example, protection from interference by compulsory
sterilization.
The term "fundamental justice" also raises problems. It could be
argued, as has been the position taken by some of the provincial
court judges, that its inclusion in section 7 simply raises to the level of
constitutional status the principles of fairness and natural justice.5"
Now the procedure would have to comply with the guarantees in the
Charter and any limitations upon them would have to be reasonable,
prescribed by law and demonstrably justifiable in a free and demo-
cratic society. "Fundamental justice" is not a term that has been
widely used in Canadian law so its meaning is obscure at the present
time. It could also be used to import a form of substantive due
process, although few courts have yet adopted this approach.
Section 7, then, is rife with interpretation problems since the
courts have never dealt with a similar clause under the previous
constitution. The Supreme Court has not yet made any decisions on
section 7 although cases have been argued before it. If the courts
choose, they could look at the recent American jurisprudence for
guidance. This uncertainty of interpretation makes it more difficult to
assess the impact of adding a property guarantee to the current
section. Before drawing any general conclusions I will examine its
potential impact on matrimonial property laws and on pension
rights.
VII. Women and Matrimonial Property
One of the concerns expressed by women about guaranteed property
rights, is that their entrenchment would have a significant detrimen-
tal impact on the type of legislation that may be enacted, especially
as it relates to women. In particular, concern may be expressed for
the advances that have been attained by the enactment of matrimon-
ial property legislation in every province. These statutes have created
new schemes for the division of assets upon divorce or separation.
While most would agree that these schemes are a great advance for
women, it is generally accepted that there is still a need for improve-
50. Supra, note 48.
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ment. Fears have been expressed that entrenchment of property
rights will jeopardize these advances made by women.
In the United States, even with the constitution's guarantees of
property rights in the fifth and fourteenth amendments, the courts
were of the view early in their interpretation of these provisions, that
the state had an interest in maintenance of its important social insti-
tutions through the exercise of the police power. With the expansion
of the police power, a list of interests developed that would justify it
use. 5 These included economic interests of the society, security of
social institutions, preservation of social resources, concern for gen-
eral progress and interest in the individual life.52 In fact, since
Lochner was repudiated, the Supreme Court has maintained basically
that the states can regulate through the exercise of their police powers
unless they are abrogating other fundamental rights in the constitu-
tion. 53 The division of matrimonial property is simply part of the
state's larger concern for the maintenance of social institutions such
as marriage and for the regulation of the parties upon divorce in the
interest of the welfare of the society as a whole.54 In the United
States, the individual states have legal authority over the famly and
therefore they bear the onus to enact divorce laws and rules relating
to division of property. There are two different kinds of r6gimes
among the states. Eight states have community property r6gimes.55
In the other forty-two states, while common law gave most of the
matrimonial property to the husband upon divorce, recent legislative
changes have incorporated sharing principles into thirty nine of
them.56 The constitution has not precluded the legislatures from
amending legislation and empowering the courts to divide and to
compel transfer of assets upon the dissolution of a marriage. This
authority is considered to be part of a state's concern for the protec-
tion of its citizens. A 1960 decision of the Supreme Court of Louisia-
na is typical of the approach taken to the constitutionality of legisla-
tion relating to domestic relations. In Hays v. Hays" the husband
51. Schwartz, The Rights of Property, New York, MacMillan Company 1965. See
this book for a lengthy discussion of American property rights.
52. Id., at 94.
53. Ferguson v. Skrupa (1962), 372 U.S. 726.
54. Supra, note 52.
55. Elizabeth Cheadle, "The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law
Marital Property States" (1981), 28 UCLA Law Review 1269.
56. Id., at 1280; fn. 63 lists all 42 states.
57. (1960), 124Jo. 2d917.
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argued that the statute requiring him to pay alimony after his divorce
was an unlawful taking of his property for private purposes. The
court made it clear that the legislature had jurisdiction to enact
divorce laws and impose conditions upon the attainment of divorce
such as the possibility of paying alimony. Since it was done according
to judicial procedure pursuant to a valid state law, it was not
unconstitutional.
In all of these situations it is clear that the courts regard family
legislation as being in the public interest. Furthermore, the legisla-
tures are requiring a fair division of property in order to protect the
interests of the parties to the marriage and of any children which may
be part of the family. Such divisions are made in full in compliance
with due process since any deprivation occurs through the most for-
mal of hearings, - the judicial process itself.
In Canada, under section 92(13) of the Constitution Act 1867, the
provinces are given authority over property and civil rights. It is
pursuant to this power that all of the matrimonial property legislation
has been enacted. The division of assets is normally triggered by the
occurence of divorce (as determined by the federal Divorce Act), or
separation. The Charter does not affect the division of powers under
the constitution so the provinces retain their authority to deal with
property and civil rights within their territorial limits. The exercise of
that authority is subject to the guarantees in the Charter, but it is
highly unlikely that the courts will question the wisdom of the legisla-
tures in enacting matrimonial property schemes.
Matrimonial property legislation and concepts are firmly
embedded in the tradition not only of Canada but also of other free
and democratic societies. Whatever limitations of the property rights
occurring under such laws results after a full judicial hearing with the
right to counsel and oral or written presentations. Even if the courts
were to interpret property rights as substantive guarantees, they could
still find matrimonial property legislation to be a reasonable limita-
tion in a free and democratic society because it is necessary for the
protection of the welfare of the society. If section 7 guarantees are to
be regarded as procedural only, it would be difficult to maintain that
the deprivation was not in accordance with the principles of funda-
mental justice. If the legislation created an unfavourable advantage
for one spouse over another based solely on presumptions relating to
sex, section 15 regarding equality may well provide a remedy unless
the legislation was designed to achieve a correction of past discrimi-
nation and hence acceptable under section 15(2).
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This argument does not deny that the courts could use the constitu-
tional expression of property rights to entrench traditional property
values in Canadian society, particularly if section 7 were to be taken
to have substantive effect. Although the trend has been to create
matrimonial schemes more equitable to women, it is entirely possible
that in times of conservative governments and under pressure from
strong lobbies a retrenchment could occur. However, even in the
absence of a right to property, the same result could be achieved by
legislative action. A strong constitution in the United States did not
prevent internment of Japanese-Americans in the 1940's nor protec-
tion of those professing communist views in the early 1950's. Fears of
this nature are legitimate in light of the past history of the Supreme
Court of Canada's interpretation of equality rights under the Cana-
dian Bill of Rights.
VIII. Division of Pension Rights
An important development in the realm of matrimonial property,
which should also be examined in the context of property rights, is
the division of pension rights. Some of the new matrimonial property
schemes include pensions as part of the matrimonial assets to be
divided. For example section 45(l)(d) of the Family Relations Act of
British Columbia defines family assets so as to include "a right of a
spouse under an annuity or a pension, home ownership or retirement
savings plan.""8 Rights to a pension may be one of the most impor-
tant assets possessed by a family.5 9 Already the Federal government
has made a provision in the Canada Pension Plan Act for the appli-
cation by a divorced spouse for a share of her/his spouse's pension
plan rights.6
In applying the provisions of the new matrimonial legislation, the
courts are beginning to grapple with the concept of pensions as
matrimonial assets. A number of recent decisions have included pen-
sions claims even when calculation of the spouse's portion would be
58. R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 121. Some Acts such as Alberta's leave the determination of
matrimonial or family assets to the courts.
59. Glendon, supra note 47.
60. R.S.C. 1970, C.C.-5, s. 53.2(l) [en. 1976-77, C. 36]. For a detailed discussion
of how this operates see Patricia Horsford, Division of Canada Pension Plan Credity
on Termination of Marriage (1980), 13 R.F.L. (2d) 48.
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difficult. 6 In Rutherford v. Rutherford, the British Columbia Court
of Appeal held that a family asset includes any pension rights, even
those that are inchoate, contingent, immature or not vested. 62 In that
decision the court required the husband to be a trustee for the wife's
undivided interest until such time as the pension accrued and could
be divided.
In Re Fischer and Fischer, the Saskatchewan Court also stated that
pension rights, whether or not vested, represented a property interest
at least to the extent that such rights are derived from employment
during the marriage.63 It seems, from the increasing number of deci-
sions, that the courts are beginning to view pension rights as a form
of property rights. As such, they would fall under the amended
section 7.
The recent United States' decisions and their new matrimonial
property legislation also indicate a trend toward regarding pension
rights as matrimonial property despite the difficulties that occur in
valuation. The change partially results from the recognition that
home-maker services are significant to a family's welfare and to it's
ability to acquire economic assets.64 It may also reflect the changing
concept of property resulting from increased dependence upon
employment and government largesse for one's livelihood. In a 1976
decision the California Supreme Court, (a community property
state), made it clear that non-vested pension rights were not an
expectancy but a contingent interest in property.65 These benefits
were not gratuities but "part of the consideration earned by the
employee."166 A number of other community property states have
also recognized an anticipated pension as a form of property. 67 The
significant factor in these developments is that they are occuring
61. See Lawrence v. Lawrence (1981), 47 N.S. (2d) 100; Bedgood v. Bedgood
(1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 42; Heminger v. Heminger (1983), 33 R.F.L. 92 (Man of B);
Jarvis v. Jarvis (1983), 32 R.F.L. 144 (B.C. Cf. B); Tataryn v. Tataryn (1982), 27
R.F.L. 283 (Sask. Cf. B); Rutherford v. Rutherford (1981), 23 R.F.L. 337 (B.C.
C.A.); Re Fischer andFischer (1983), 31 R.F.L. (2d) 274 (Sask. Q. B.).
63. Id.
63. Fischer, supra, note 62, at 277.
64. "Spousal Rights in Retirement and Pension Benefits" (1977-78) 16 Journal of
Family Law, 187.
65. In Re Brown 15 Cal. 3d 838 544 P. 2d 561. For a discussion see in ReMarriage
of Brown: at last an Equal Division of Pension Rights (1977), 95 S.W.U.L.R. 670.
66. 544 P. (2d) at 566.
67. For example see Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P. 2d, 876 (1977); Swope v.
Mitchell, 324 80 2d 461 (La. App. 1975).
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within the guarantees of section five and fourteen of the American
Bill of Rights. With the recognition of pension interests as property
rights, a court is merely required to ascertain if their deprivation was
in accordance with the principles of due process.
On the basis of this analysis, if the Canadian courts continue to
follow their trend of treating pensions as part of matrimonial assets,
they will likely be regarded as a form of property. In the American
context, similar developments are occuring with no perceived inter-
ference with due process guarantees. Again, it could be surmised that
the legal changes are due, in part, to the recognition of the signifi-
cance of pensions to a family's assets and are included in the state's
legitimate concern for protection of family members upon divorce or
separation.
IX. Conclusions
Although there are many other areas pertaining to property that are
of concern to women, such as public housing, rent control, and
occupational health and safety regulations, the general principles
discussed can be applied to them as well.
After an extensive examination of current Canadian law and
American experience, it becomes apparent that there is no simple
answer to the question of the impact of entrenched property rights on
women. Given the current phraseology of section 7 and the history of
judicial conservatism in Canada, it cannot be said with certainty
what would be the ultimate impact on women of entrenchment of
property rights in the way proposed.
It is certain that, although there may be a guarantee of enjoyment
of property, under no interpretation could it be an absolute right.
Section 1 of the Charter makes it clear that none of the guarantees
contained therein are absolute, while section 7 itself makes it plain
that deprivations are contemplated in accordance with the principles
of fundamental justice. Though property rights have always been
considered important in Canada, they have always been subject to
overriding state interests.
Property is regarded by the majority of philosophers as essential to
the liberty and growth of the individual, whether they have tradi-
tional or newer forms of property in mind. Also essential to an
individual's growth and self-esteem is the knowledge that his or her
property cannot be taken away by arbitrary action but only when
other societal needs override. Women, as much or more than men,
need to feel secure with respect to the property and benefits that they
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have. If section 7 were to be treated as procedural and to have the
effect of constitutionalizing the principles of natural justice and fair-
ness, it could be beneficial to women since they tend on the whole to
have a greater reliance on government largesse. If security of the
person were to be interpreted in the manner suggested by the Law
Reform commision, then it could accomplish the same result. In fact
this approach is preferable since it would no have the dangers asso-
ciated with a property entrenchment because the courts are unlikely
to interpret the concept in the same manner as the term property.
There has been some suggestion that security of property could be
extended to encompass traditional property but that would require a
distortion of section 7. However, since section 7 is located in the legal
rights section, it may be wishful thinking to anticipate an interpreta-
tion of security of the person which would extend protection to the
new property.
American constitutional history since Lochner has not supported
male vested property interests, at least in the area of matrimonial
property, since community property and new division of property
schemes have been enacted in an effort to ensure fairness in divorce
situations. Lochner represented the culmination of the laissezfaire
doctrine which had prevailed prior to the welfare state. It is highly
unlikely that our courts would return to this philosophy unless our
society changes dramatically. Matrimonial property cases, at present,
are decided in a similar manner in both Canada and the United
States despite differences in our legal traditions.
There have been few challenges to the American Matrimonial
property legislation under the due process clause. It seems to be
generally accepted that the state has the power to interfere with or
redistribute property where societal needs require it. In Canada, how-
ever, there would likely be challenges for several reasons. The first is
that the Charter is new and many lawyers will use it as a last effort to
win a case that they would otherwise lose under current matrimonial
property legislation. Secondly, in the United States the police power
was early recognized and clarified before matrimonial property legis-
lation was truly significant. Canadian courts still must grapple with
the limits of the state's power plus ascertaining the values upon which
these rights have been premised. This will involve many years and
many decisions.
Since there are so many uncertainties, it can be said that
entrenchment of property rights at the present time would not likely
be beneficial to women. Since the battles were long to attain more
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equal matrimonial property regimes, it is understandable that women
would like to concentrate on redressing other inequities rather than
facing challenges to the existing legislation in the courts. If the courts
will act creatively they could interpret section 7 as it now stands to
protect the new forms of property to the very great benefit of women.
There is no need, at present, to provide property guarantees which
could potentially have the effect of protecting vested interests in
Canada - many of which do not accrue to women.
